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LIST OF EXHIBITS
Hearing Transcript taken on March 12, 2012 will be lodged with the Supreme Court:

Exhibits admitted into record before Idaho Department of Labor
1.

Notice of Telephone Hearing, mailed February 27, 2012 (3 pages)

2.

Important Information about your Hearing Read Carefully (2 pages)

2b

Unemployment Insurance Claimant Benefit Rights, Responsibilities and Filing
Instructions (35 pages)

3.

Claim Summary December 13, 2011 (5 pages)

3a.

Claim Summary February 22, 2012 (6 pages)

4.

IVRU Reports December 27, 2010 (52 pages)

5.

TALX memo January 11, 2012 (5 pages)

6.

Quit-Claimant Statement No date submitted (3 pages)

7.

TALX documents January 26, 2012 (7 pages)

8.

Eligibility Determination Unemployment Insurance Claim January 8, 2012 (2 pages)

9.

Eligibility Determination Unemployment Insurance Claim February 8, 2012 (3 pages)

10.

Determination of overpayment February 8, 2012 (1 page)

11.

Explanation of improper payment February 8, 2012 (3 pages)

12.

Appeal of Determination (Eligibility) February 22, 2012 (8 pages)

12a.

Written warning- Job performance and Poor leadership October 26, 2010 (3 pages)

13.

Appeal of Determination (False statement) February 22, 2012 (8 pages)

13a.

Written warning- Job performance and Poor leadership October 26, 2010 (3 pages)

14.

Employer's Data February 24, 2012 (1 page)

15.

Benefit payment history February 24, 2012 (5 pages)

16.

Overpayment data February 24, 2012 (9 pages)

LIST OF EXHIBITS - (Bringman, SC # 40232) - (i)

APPEALS BUREAU
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
317 WEST MAIN STREET I BOISE, IDAHO 83735-0720
(208) 332-3572 / (800) 621-4938
FAX: (208) 334-6440

BILLY J BRINGMAN,

)
)
)
)

SSN:
Claimant

vs.
NEW ALBERTSONS INC,
Employer
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

) DOCKET NUMBER 2865-2012
)
) DECISION OF APPEALS EXAMINER
)
)
)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)
DECISION
Benefits are DENIED effective December 5, 2010.
The employer's account is NOT CHARGEABLE on the claim.
The Eligibility Determination dated February 8, 2012, which concluded that the claimant quit his
job without good cause connected with the employment, is hereby AFFIRMED.
·
Benefits are DENIED effective December 5, 2010 through December 3, 2011, and effective
December 11, 2011 through January 14, 2012. The claimant is also NOT ELIGIBLE for
benefits effective February 5, 2012 through February 2, 2013. ·

The Eligibility Determination dated February 8, 2012, which concluded that the claimant
willfully made a false statement or failed to report a material fact on his claim, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Waiver of the requirement that the claimant repay benefits owed to the Employment Security
Fund is NOT GRANTED.
HISTORY OF THE CASE
The above-entitled matter was heard by Thomas J. Holden, Appeals Examiner for the Idaho
Department of Labor, on March 12, 2012, by telephone in the City of Boise, in accordance with
§72-1368(6) ofthe Idaho Employment Security Law.
The claimant, Billy Bringman, participated in the hearing and was represented by C. Tom Arkoosh.
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The employer, New Albertsons Inc., was represented in the hearing by Frank Eckert. Shane Wright
participated in the hearing as a witness for the employer.
The respondent, the Idaho Department of Labor, was represented in the hearing by Elaine Mattson.
ISSUES
The issues before the Department are whether unemployment is due to the claimant quitting
voluntarily and, if so, whether with good cause connected with the employment -OR- being
discharged and, if so, whether for misconduct in connection with the employment, according to
§72-1366(5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law, whether the employer's account is properly
chargeable for experience rating purposes for benefits paid to the claimant, according to
§72-1351(2)(a) of the Idaho Employment Security Law, whether the claimant willfully made a
false statement or representation or willfully failed to report a material fact in order to obtain
unemployment insurance benefits, according to §72-1366(12) of the Idaho Employment Security
Law, and whether the claimant has received benefits to which s/he was not entitled, and if so,
whether the requirement to repay benefits owed to the Employment Security Fund may be
waived, according to §72-1369(5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the exhibits and testimony in the record, the following facts are found:
I.

The claimant worked as an assistant store director for Albertsons from May 12, 2004,
through December 4, 2010.

2.

The employer received a complaint that the claimant provided poor customer service.
The claimant refused to accept a check from a regular customer.

3.

On October 26, 2010, the employer gave the claimant a write-up over the incident. The
claimant refused to sign the write-up because he believed that the write-up would be used
against him in the future. The employer sent the claimant home.

4.

When the claimant returned to work several weeks later, the claimant met with the vice
president of human relations, Shane Wright. Mr. Wright informed the claimant that he
could either resign and accept a· severance package, or he would be demoted and
transferred to another store.

5.

The claimant chose to resign and accept the severance package.

6.

The claimant reported to the Department of Labor that the reason for his separation was
due to laid off/lack of work.

7.

In the first four of the five calendar quarters preceding the one in which the claimant
applied for benefits, this employer paid the claimant more wages than any other
employer.
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AUTHORITY
Section 72-1366(5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law provides in pertinent part that a
Claimant is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits if the claimant voluntarily quit
without good cause connected with employment or was discharged for misconduct in connection
with employment.

If an employee voluntarily quits employment, the burden is on the employee to prove that it was for
good cause. Pyeatt vs. Idaho State Univ., 98 Idaho 424, 565 P.2d 1381 (1977). The Idaho Supreme
Court adopted the definition of "good cause" in Burroughs vs. Employment Sec. Agency, 86 Idaho
412, 387 P.2d 473 (1963):

In order to constitute good cause, the circumstances which compel the decision to leave
employment must be real, not imaginary, substantial, not trifling, and reasonable, not
whimsical; there must be some compulsion produced by extraneous and necessitous
circumstances.
The standard of what constitutes good cause is the standard of
reasonableness as applied to the average man or woman and not to the supersensitive.
Ibid at p. 414. Thus, purely personal reasons are not "good cause" for quitting a job. Moreover,
when an employee has viable options available to him or her, voluntary termination without
exploring those options does not constitute good cause for obtaining unemployment compensation.
Ellis vs. Northwest Fruit & Produce, Inc., 103 Idaho 821, 654 P.2d 914 (1982). This requirement
stems from the policy of the law to encourage employers and employees to adjust their differences
and avoid interrupting employment. Hart vs. Deary High School, 126 Idaho 550, 552, 887 P.2d
1057, 1059 (1994) 550, 553 887 P.2d 1057, 1060.
Section 72-1351(2)(a) of the Idaho Employment Security Law provides in part that for
experience rating purposes, no charge shall be made to the account of such covered employer
with respect to benefits paid to a worker who terminated his services voluntarily without good
cause attributable to such covered employer, or who had been discharged for misconduct in
connection with such services.
Section 72-1366(12) of the Idaho Employment Security Law provides that a claimant shall not
be entitled to benefits for a period of fifty-two (52) weeks if it is determined that he has willfully
made a false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact in order to obtain benefits. The
period of disqualification shall commence the week the determination is issued. The claimant
shall also be ineligible for waiting week credit and shall repay any sums received for any week
for which the claimant received waiting week credit or benefits as a result of having willfully
made a false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact. The claimant shall also be
ineligible for waiting week credit or benefits for any week in which he owes the department an
overpayment, civil penalty, or interest resulting from a determination that he willfully made a
false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact.
"Willfully" implies simply a purpose or willingness to cominit the act or make the omission
referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, in the sense of having an evil or corrupt
motive or intent. It does imply a conscious wrong, and may be distinguished from an act
maliciously or corruptly done in that it does not necessarily imply an evil mind, but is more
nearly synonymous with "intentionally," "designedly," and therefore not accidental. Meyer vs.
Skyline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 77, 589 P.2d 89 (1979).
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A finding that a benefit claimant knew or thought it highly probable that he or she did not know
what information a question solicited but nevertheless deliberately chose to respond without
pursuing clarification would ordinarily support a conclusion of willful falsehood or concealment
Meyer vs. Skyline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 77, 589 P.2d 89 (1979).
Section 72~1369(5)(a) of the Idaho Employment Security Law provides: (5) The director may
waive the requirement to repay an overpayment, other than one resulting from a false statement,
misrepresentation, or failure to report a material fact by the claimant, and interest thereon, if: (a)
the benefit payments were made solely as a result of department error or inadvertence and made
to a claimant who could not reasonably have been expected to recognize the error.

In order for repayment of an erroneously paid benefit to be waived, the claimant must show:
(1)
that such payments were not the result of a false statement, misrepresentation or
concealment of a material fact by the claimant
(2)
that such payments were made solely.as a result of department error or inadvertence; and,
(3)
that such payments were made to a claimant who had no way of knowing that he [or she]
was receiving benefits to which he [or she] was not entitled. Blayney vs. City of Boise,
110 Idaho 302, 307, 715 P.2d 972, 977 (1986)

CONCLUSIONS
The claimant quit his job after the claimant was given a write-up that he disagreed with. The
claimant could have continued in his position by signing the write-up. While the claimant may
have disagreed with the write-up, it has not been established that the employer's request was so
unreasonable or burdensome that the claimant's most prudent recourse was to quit his job. The
claimant did not quit his job with good cause connected with the employment. Therefore, the
claimant is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits, and the employer's account is not
chargeable on the claim.
The claimant reported to the Department of Labor that the reason for his separation from
Albertsons was due to laid of£1lack of work There have been no facts presented which would
support a conclusion that the claimant was laid off or that there was a lack of work. The
claimant has not provided a reasonable explanation for failing to provide accurate information to
the Department of Labor. It must be concluded that the claimant willfully made false statements
or representations or willfully failed to report material facts in order to obtain unemployment
insurance benefits. Therefore, the claimant is ineligible for benefits, and the claimant does not
meet the criteria for a waiver of the requirement that the claimant repay benefits owed to the
Employment Security Fund.

Date of Mailing

DECISION OF APPEALS EXAMINER - 4 of 6

Last Day To Appeal

APPEAL RIGHTS

You have FOURTEEN (ill DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILING to file a written appeal with
the Idaho Industrial Commission. The appeal must be mailed to:
Idaho fudustrial Commission
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041
Or delivered in person to:
Idaho Industrial Commission
700 S Clearwater Lane
Boise, ID 83712
Or transmitted by facsimile to:
{208) 332-7558.
If the appeal is mailed, it must be postmarked no later than the last day to appeal. An appeal filed
by facsimile transmission must be received by the Commission by 5:00 p.m., Mountain Time, on
the last day to appeal. A facsimile transmission received after 5:00 p.m. will be deemed received by
the Commission on the next business day.. A late appeal will be dismissed. Appeals filed by any
means with the Appeals Bureau or a Department of Labor local office will not be accepted by the
Commission. TO EMPLOYERS WHO ARE INCORPORATED: Ifyoufile an appeal with the
Idaho Industrial Commission, the appeal must be signed by a corporate officer or legal counsel
licensed to practice in the State ofIdaho and the signature must include the individual's title. The
Commission will not consider appeals submitted by employer representatives who are not attorneys.
Ifyou request a hearing before the Commission· or permission to file a legal brief. you must make
these requests through legal counsel licensed to practice in the State ofIdaho. Questions should be
directed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, Unemployment Appeals, (208) 334·6024.

If no appeal is filed, this decision will become final and cannot be changed. TO CLAIMANT: If
this decision is changed, any benefits paid will be subject to repayment. If an appeal is filed, you
should continue to report on your claim as long as you are unemployed.
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APPEALS BUREAU
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
317 WEST MAIN STREET I BOISE, IDAHO 83735-0720
(208) 332-3572 / (800) 621-4938
FAX: (208) 334-6440

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on

/11bJt4 ef-3 1 :JDl1-

,

a true and correct copy of

Decision of Appeals Examiner was served by regular United States mail upon each of the
following:
BILLY I BRINGMAN
10618 W PATTIE ST.
.BOISE ID 83713
NEW ALBERTSONS INC/ T ALX UC EXPRESS
P 0 BOX 173860
DENVER CO 80217-3860
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR-BOISE
CLAIM DIVISION ATTN: OFFICE MANAGER
219 WMAIN ST
BOI E ID 83735-0030
CAPITOL LAW GROUP PLLC
ATTN: C. TOM ARKOOSH
P OBOX2598
BOISE ID 83701-2598
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04/05/2012

15:21

20842
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CAPITOL LAW

IP

PAGE

01/02

C. Tom Arkoosh, ISB # 2253
CAPITOL LAW GROUP, PLLC
250 North l 0th Street, 4th t<'loor
P.O. Box 2598
Boise, Idaho 83701-2598
Telephone:
(208) 424-8872
Facsimile:
(208) 424-8874
Attorney for Billy l Bringman
APPEALS BUREAU
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

BILLY J. BRINGMAN,
Docket No. 2865-2012

SSN
Claimant,

NOTICE OF APPEAL OF APPEALS
EXAMINER DECISION

vs.
NEW ALBERTSONS INC.,
Employer
and

lDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

COMES NOW, Claimant, Billy J. Bringman, by and through his counsel of record,
Capitol Law Group, PLLC, and hereby files a Notice of Appeal in reference to the Decision of
Appeals Examiner filed on March

23~

2012. Claimant requests an agency record be prepared by

the agency, and the Commission consider written bri.efing thereon.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.

NOTICE OP APPEAL OF APPEALS EXAMINER DECISION· Page I

04/05/2012 THU 18: 28

[TX/RX NO 8:335]

14J 001

04/05/2012

15:21
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CAPITOL LAW

IP

PAGE

02/02

,.,...DATED this

_:i_ day of April, 2012.
CAPITOL LAW

By:

GROUP~

PLLC

·~ -----~-·~---·

----·-···--

C. Torn Arkoosh, Of the Finn
Attorneys for Billy J. Bringman

CERTIFlCATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day of April, 2012, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) listed below, i11 the manner indicated:
Idaho Department of Labor
Appeals Bureau
317 W. Main St.

Boise, ID 83735

U.S. Mail, postage prepa.icl
Overnight Courier
Hand Delivered
Facsimile 332-7558

C. To.ni-Arkoosh-v==·

NOTICE OF APPEAL OF APPEALS EXAMINER DECISION - Page 2

04/05/2012 THU 18: 28

[TX/RX HO 8:335]

~

002

...

•. ·

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, GOVERNOR

POBox83720
Boise, ID 83720-0041
(208) 334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321
1-800-950-2110

COMMISSIONERS
Thomas E. Limbaugh, Chainnan
Thomas P. Baskin
R.D. Maynard
Mindy Montgomery, Director

April 10, 2012
:it
~ ·. ~~.

New Albertsons, Inc.
C/O TALX UC Express
PO Box 173860
Denver, CO 80217-3860

·::

RE: Billy
New Albertsons, Inc.
SS #
IDOL# 2865-2012
Dear Talx UC Express Representative:
The Idaho Industrial Commission received an appeal in the above entitled unemployment insurance
case. According to the Idaho Department of Labor Appeals Examiner's Decision, you represented
the employer in this matter prior to this appeal.
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-1323, Rule 4 of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure under
the Idaho Employment Security Law, effective as amended March 1, 2009, and Idaho Supreme
Court case law (White v. Idaho Forest Industries, 98 Idaho 784, 572 P.2d 887 (1977); Kyle v. Beco
~. 109 Idaho 267, 707 P.2d 378 (1985)), the Idaho Industrial Commission cannot allow thirdparty, non-attorney representation of an employer in these matters. Consequently, you will not be
served with any additional information related to this appeal.
The Commission does not have a current mailing address for the employer. Please inform your
client that if they want to receive documentation related to this appeal or otherwise participate in the
appeal process, they must provide the Commission with their mailing address, in writing, or appear
before the Commission through an attorney licensed to practice law in the state ofldaho.
"

Assistant Commission Secretary
cc:
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

STATE HOUSE MAIL
317 W MAIN STREETBOISE ID 83735

CAPITOL LAW GROUP PLLC
ATTN: C TOM ARKOOSH
PO BOX2598
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-2598

700 So. Clearwater Ln., Boise, ID
Equal Opportunity Employer

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
BILL
SSN:

,
Claimant,

IDOL 2865-2012

V.

NEW ALBERTSONS, INC.,
Employer,

NOTICE OF FILING
OF APPEAL

and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: The Industrial Commission has received an appeal from a
decision of an Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. A copy of the appeal is
enclosed, along with a copy of the Commission's Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure.
PLEASE READ ALL THE RULES CAREFULLY
The Industrial Commission promptly processes all unemployment appeals in the order
received. In the mean time, you may want to visit our web site for more information:
www.iic.idaho.gov.
The Commission will make its decision in this appeal based on the record of the
proceedings before the Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS DIVISION
POST OFFICE BOX 83 720
BOISE IDAHO 83720-0041
(208) 334-6024
Calls Received by the Industrial Commission May Be Recorded

NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 10111 day of April, 2012 a true and correct copy of the Notice
of Filing of Appeal and compact disc of the Hearing was served by regular United States mail
upon the following:

APPEAL AND DISC:
CAPITOL LAW GROUP PLLC
ATTN: C TOM ARKOOSH
PO BOX 2598
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-2598
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
STATE HOUSE MAIL
317 W MAIN STREET
BOISE ID 83735

aas

NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 2

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRAIG G. BLEDSOE ISB# 3431
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN - ISB# 4050
CHERYL GEORGE- ISB# 4213
Deputy Attorneys General
Idaho Department of Labor
317 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 73 5
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 ext. 3148

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BILLY J. BRINGMAN,
Claimant,
vs.
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC.,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL NO. 2865-2012

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

~~~~~~~~~-)
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTIES:
Please be advised that the undersigned Deputy Attorney General representing the
Idaho Department of Labor hereby enters the appearance of said attorneys as the
attorneys of record for the State of Idaho, Department of Labor, in the above-entitled
proceeding.

By statute, the Department of Labor is a party to all unemployment

insurance appeals in Idaho.

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 1

DATED this~_ day of April, 2012.

Tracey K. / I}sen
Deputy Att©flley General
Idaho Department of Labor

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE,
was mailed, postage prepaid, this
C TOM ARKOOSH
PO BOX2598
BOISE ID 83701

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2

~-day

of April, 2012, to:
NEW ALBERTSONS INC
C/O TALX UC EXPRESS
PO BOX 173860
DENVER CO 80217-3860

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
BILLY J. BRINGMAN,
Claimant,
IDOL # 2865-2012
vs.
ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING;
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC.,
Employer,

ORDER ESTABLISHING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE

and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.
Claimant, Billy J. Bringman, through counsel, appealed a Decision issued by an Idaho
Department of Labor ("IDOL") Appeals Examiner finding: 1) Claimant voluntarily quit his job
without good cause connected with the employment, 2) Employer's account is not chargeable for
experience rating purposes, 3) Claimant willfully made a false statement or failed to report a
material fact in order to obtain; and 4) Claimant was not entitled to a waiver of the requirement
that he repay benefits owed to the Employment Security Fund. Claimant requests a new hearing
to provide oral argument as well as the opportunity to submit a brief in this matter. (Claimant's
appeal, filed April 5, 2012).
New Hearing to Submit Oral Argument
Idaho Code § 72-1368(7) grants the Commission authority to "in its sole discretion,
conduct a hearing to receive additional evidence or may remand the matter back to the appeals
examiner for an additional hearing and decision" if the interests of justice so require. The Idaho
Supreme Court has consistently upheld that it is within the Commission's sole discretion to
determine whether to consider additional evidence and that those decisions will not be overturned
absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Appeals Examiner of Idaho Department of Labor
v. J.R. Simplot Co., 131Idaho318, 955 P.2d 1097 (1998). According to Rule 7(B) of the Rules of

ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING; ORDER ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE
-1

Appellate Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Employment Security Law ("R.A.P.P."),
effective as amended, January 1, 2012, a party requesting to offer additional evidence shall submit,
among other requirements, the "reason for requesting a hearing." A party seeking to provide oral
argument based on the record as it stands must present some justification for that request.
Unemployment insurance appeals are adjudicated under the principles and procedures of
administrative law. Hearings at this level of review are not a matter of right, as in other forums.
Claimant requests a new hearing in order to submit oral argument.

(Claimant's request).

Upon review, the Commission finds it is unnecessary to delay this matter further to hold a hearing
for oral argument. Claimant received ample opportunity to present argument in this matter. Prior
to the hearing, the Appeals Bureau advised both parties of the issue and the importance of
presenting all relevant evidence to the Appeals Examiner.

(Exhibits 1 & 2).

Claimant was

represented by counsel at the hearing and received a full and fair opportunity to present its case to
the Appeals Examiner. The record is this matter is sufficient. Furthermore, Claimant did not set
forth any reason for his request as is required by the R.A.P .P. Without argument from Claimant,
the Commission is without a basis with which to determine whether a new hearing is warranted.
The Commission takes the position that conducting a new hearing at this level of review is
an extraordinary measure and should be reserved for those cases when due process or other
interests of justice demand no less.

No such circumstances exist here.

Claimant received

adequate due process and ample opportunity to present his case in this matter. Claimant's request
for a new hearing to provide oral argument is DENIED.
BRIEFING SCHEDULE

In lieu of an opportunity for a new hearing, the Commission grants Claimant's request to
submit a brief pursuant to Rule 5(A) of the R.A.P.P. The parties may prepare written argument
ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING; ORDER ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE

-2

based on the evidentiary record as it stands. Any inclusion of, or comment on, additional evidence
in a brief will not be considered by the Commission. All briefs must comply with the R.A.P.P., a
copy of which the Commission supplied to the interested parties with the Notice of Appeal.
The Commission establishes the following briefing schedule:
Claimant's brief will be due ten (10) days from the date of this Order.
Employer, through counsel, and the Idaho Department of Labor may reply within seven (7)
days of the receipt of Claimant's brief, if they so choose.
DATED

this~y

2012.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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C. Thomas Arkoosh

• talrkoosh@oapitollawgrou-p.com

April 30, 2012

VIA FAC SIM.ILE 332-7558
Thomas .L Holden, Appeals Examiner
Idaho Industrial Commission
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041
Re:

Bringman v. Albertson and IDOL
Docket No: 2865-2012
CLG File No. 6413.000

J

Dear Mr. Holden:

This office received from the Department of Labor's Appeals E aminer, an audio
recording of the hearing. Because, to my knowledge, there is no written t't'a script, I have cited
to points in time in the audio transcript in the Memorandum filed herewith.
I

If there is any question regarding these citations, please contact
information in the above letterhead.

m~

offi.ce using the

Sincerely,
Capitol Law Group, PLLC

C. Thomas Arkoosh
CTA:lbt
Enclosures

205 N. JO'h S!rnr.:t, 4th Floor, PO Box 2:598, Boise, ID 8370 I ·2598 • Tel: (208) 424-8872 • F:,ix; (208) 424-8874
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C. Torn Arkoosh, ISB # 2253
CAPITOL LAW GROUP, PLLC
250 Nm1h 10th Street, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 2598
Boise, Idaho 83701-2598
Telephone:
(208) 424-8872
(208) 424-8874
Facsimile:
Attorney for Billy J. Bringman
APPEALS BUREAU
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

BILLY J. HRlNC1M1\N,

Docket No. 2865-2012

SSN
Claimant~

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
NOTICE OF APPEAi.,

vs.
NEW ALBERTSONS INC.>
Employer
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

This Memorandum in Support of Noti.cc of Appeal is filed on behalf of Bllly J. Bringman
("Bringman") in :>upport of his Notice of Appeal. filed April 5, 2012.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.

Bringman worked for Albcrtsons from 2004, not long after his return from active

combat duty in Tra.g, until November. l l, 2010.

2.

Albcrtsons check policy requires that store employees see customer identification

prior to accepting checks from customers as payment for purchases at the store. On October 5,
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2011, a customer tTied to purchase groceries from the Albertsons store at which Bringman
worked without identification.

Pursuant to Albe1.isons policy, Bringman did not accept the

customer's check without identification.
3.

On October 26, 2010, an Albertsons store director issued Bringman a written

warning for poor performance and poor leadership skills relating to the customer check issue.
Because Bi;ngman followed company policy in not accepting the check, Bringman refused to
s1gn the warning. Following his refusal. to sign the warning, the store director sent Bringman
home until further notice.
4.

After three weeks away from work pursuant to the store director's instruction,

Albertsons called Bringman to a rneeting with Shane Wright, Vice President of Albertsons
("Wright"). At that meeting, Wright presented Bringman with two options- First, Bringman
could resign and accept a severance package and Albcrtsons would not contest any fi]jng for

unemployment benefits_

Alternatively~

Wright told Bringman he could stay with the

company~

but that Albcrtsons's would transfer him, demote him from his title of Assistant Store Director to
a subordinate title, and pay him $13.50 per hour~ approximately $20,000 Icss than he was paid
prior to his mandatory leave, and approximately half of his salary of $46,000 prior to leave.
Bringman accepted the severance package.
5.

On December 5, 2010, Bringman filed with the Idaho Department of Labor ("the

Department") for unemployment benefits and b<;:gan receiving benefits thereafter until December
5, 201 l. The Department's on.line application for unemployment benefits offers three choices to
describe an applicanf s termination: I) Quit, 2) Terminated, or 3) Laid-off due to Jack of work.
The application sets forth no option for constructive discharge. On both his December 2010
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application and his December 2011 reapplication for unemployment benefits, Bri.ngn1an selected
"Jaid-offdue to Jack of work" as his cause of termination.
6.

Albertsons did not respond or ol~ject to Bringman's first application for

unemployment benefits.
7.

The Department responded to Bringrnan's December 2011 reapplication with tvvo

Determinations of Overpayment ("Determinations"), stating that Bringman ''did not provide
accurate separation infom1ation in an attempt to obtain benefits 1o which he was not entitled" and
quit his position without exploring the options that were available to him.

8.

Bringman appealed the Department's Determinations) and on March

12~

2012,, a

hearing was held in front of the Department's Appeals Examiner ("Examiner'')9.

At the hearing, Wright testified that Albcrtsons tenuinated Bringman due to

problems with Bringman's performance, following the

write~up,

that were reported to Wright on

a "phone call [he] received from the store director Audrey and the district manager Tim
Johnson'', further asserting that Bringman' s termination had nothing to do with the write-up
following the check incident, but, rather, "continuing problems and issues that had happencd .... i '
Audio Recording at 57:10. Wright went on to testify that Bringman, following the write-up,
" ... had made it worse in the store.') Audio Recording at 57:26.

During further testimony,

Wright agreed that the write-up was titled «Last and Final Warning".

Further, whei1 asked

whether Bringman returned to the store following that write-up, Wright answered that Bringman
had returned to the store; but that he did not have personal knowledge of this fact and would not
"get into details as to why rhe) didn't have that information in front of [him]". Audio Recording
at 59:29. Bringman testified that he, in fact, did not retum to work following the write-up. No
corporate records were produced as direct evidence to conflict with Bringman's testimony.
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At that hearing; Elaine Mattson of the Idaho Department of Labor ("Mattson'')

questioned Bringman regarding whether ''there was work available" and whether he was "laid
off for Jack of work'~. Audio Recording at I: l 0:52_ Bringman answered that he had been told
his only option besides severance was to accept a position with inferior duties to the one he held
and that offered compensation of approximately half of what he earned at the time of the writeup.

Mattson asked Bringman, then, whether there was any other work he could do for.

Albcrtsons. Bringman responded that by her de llnition of "any work'; there was some other
work available. The Examiner dee.lined to include in his Findings of Fact any details regarding
the employment offered to Mr. Bringman.

11.

At the bearing, Bringman testified that he left his employment for good cause.

Mattson agreed in her testimony that "left his employment voluntarily without good cause
connected with his employment, or that he was discharged for misconduct in connection with h.i.s
employment" is the language of the statute applicable to claimant eligibility for uncmploymeut
compensation. However, when claimant's counsel C. Torn Arkoosh ("Arkoosh") questioned Ms.
Mattson regarding whether there was a prohibition keeping the Department from using the
language of the statute in the on line questionnaire, Mattson answered that there was not When
Arkoosh asked whether using the langt1age of the statute might make the questionnaire clearer,
Mattson answered, "No. That's why we do the fact finding .... '' Audio Recording at 1: 14:25.
However~ immediately following this statement, Mattson acknowledged that, contrary to her

statement immediately prior, there is no "fact-finding drop-down'' in the screen immediately
following this questionnaire_ Aud1o Recording at I: 14:28. In response to further questioning,
Mattson then asserted that, although the fact finding she had described did not take place, that
this problem could not have been rcso.lved by the questionnaire because, "Laid off due to Jack of
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work is exactly what it means - laid off due to .lack of work. You don't need to explain laid off
due to lack of work."

Audio Recording at l: 14:47.

Denying the lack of clarity in the

questionnaire that led to the hearing, Mattson asserted that " . .,we' re having a discussion a.bout
whether or not the claimant voluntarily quit his job ... .'' Audio Recording at l :15:05. Mattson
offered no explanation as to why clearer statutory language is not used in the questionnaire.
12.

In her testimony, Mattson repeatedly referred to Bringman's "separation", a te11n

used in neither the applicable statute nor the online questionnaire but that> in addjtion to "quit'),
"terminated" and "laid off'' makes four different possible descriptions for an employee's lcaviiig
his employment. In her testimony, Mattson stated that Bringman should have chosen "a choice
with a separation", however, when asked if there was an option representing "a choice with a
separation" in the online questionna.irc, she states that, in order to choose snch an option for
separation, Bringman would have had to select "quit" or "terminated".
I :02:43.

Audio Recording at

Manson offored no explanation, however, for how a clajmant should make the

connection between "separationj' and ('quit" or

"terminated~~.

Following up on her assert.ion

regarding "separation'\ Mattson stated that, ('Bottom line for the Department is

that~

whether

[Bringman] quit or was fired, it doesn't matter, it's splitting hairs. There was a separation."
Au1do Recording at 1:03:39.

13.

When, in further inquiring as to ways to make the questionnaire clearer, Arkoosh

asked if the state agreed or disagreed that it should supply a line item for "termination without
cause'', Mattson answered "disagree".

Audio Recording at l: 17:07.

response, Arkoosh asked Mattson whether

~'if a

When, following that

person feels that they had to quit for abuse, say,

ot sexual harassment they're supposed to put quit?'~

Mattson responded "That is correct."

Audio Recording at l: 17:20.
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Jn the findings of fact, the appeals examiner states that

"On October 26, 2012, the employer gave the claimant a write-up over the
incident. The claimant refused to sign the write-up because he believed that the
write-up would be used again,;it him in the future."
The Examiner's conclusion directly contradicts Bringman's testimony, in which he stated that he
refused to sign the write-up because "l would have been signing a document saying I had done
something vvrong, when in actuality l was following company po.licics and procedures .... "
Audio Recording at 14:15. Bringman's testimony goes on to describe the contrast between the
w-ritc-up and the Albertsons policy sfa.tement

15. The Exarn.iner concluded that "There have been no facts presented which would
support a conclnsicm that the claimant was laid off or that there was a lack of work."
APPLICABLE LAW
An employer constmctivdy discharges an employee when the employer makes working
conditions unendurable, resu]ting in the employee's reasonable decision to resign. Waterman v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 201 P.3d 640, 645 (Idaho 2009).
A claimant has good cause to voluntary leave his employment where
''the circumstances which compel the decision to leave employment [arc] reaL
not imaginary, substantial, not trifling, and reasonable, not whimsical; there must
be some compulsion produced by extraneous and necessitous circumstances, and

the standard of what constitutes good cause is the standard of reasonableness as
applied to the average man 01- woman."
Jensen v. Siemsen, l l 8 Idaho 1~ 4, 794 P.2d 271, 274 (1990).
Idaho Code§ 72-1366 sets forth the requirements an applicant must meet in order to be
eligible for unemployment compensation. Jn particular, LC§ 72-1366(5) allows a claimant to
rcce1ve compensation where
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"The claimant's unemployment is not due to the fact that he left bis employment
voluntarily without good cause connected with his ernployment, or that he was
discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment."
A finding that a benefit claimant knew or thought it highly probable that he or she did not
know what information a question solicited but nevertheless deliberately chose to respond
whhout pursuing clarification woulcl ordinarily support a conclusion of willful falsehood or
concealment See A1eyer v. SA.yline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 754, 589 P.2d 89 (1979).
A daimant acts willfully if he or she "purposely, intentionally, consciot1sly, or knowingly

fails to report material facts." ld. at 96-97. Willful implies simply a purpose or willingness to
commit the act or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law .... "
Current v. l!addons Fencing, Inc., 152 Idaho 10, 13-14, 266 P.3d

485~ 488~89

(2011 ). However,

willfulness does not include accidental omissions due to "negligence, misunderstanding or other
cause." Id.

Idaho Code § 72-1366( 12) states "A claimant shall not be entitled to benefits for a period

of fifty-two (52) weeks if it is determined that he has willfully made a false statement or willfully
failed to report a material fact in order to obtain benefits."

ARGUMENT
I.

Albcrtsons Constructively Oischargcd Bringman.

16.

An employer constructively discharges an employee when the en1ploycr makes

working conditions unendurable, resulting in the cmployee;s reasonable decision to resign.

Waterman, 201 P.3d at 645. Albcrtsons asked Bringman to sign a document by which it asked
hiru to falsely admit to disobeying compa.ny policy. In Conclusions, the Exa111iner begins his
analysis by writing, "The claimant quit his job after the claimant was given a write-up that he
disagreed with."

However~

the vvrite-up Al.bertsons gave Bringman states that Bringman
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"fail[cd] to follow division standards, policies and practices .... " See "Exhibit A" to Bringman's
"Appeal of Determination (False Statement)". However, when Bringman refused to accept the
disgruntled customer's personal check he did so in accordance with the company policy .in effect
at that time, which ordered store c:mployees to "Verify ID on all personal check systern
prompts .. .''. ld. TI1e Examiner is correct in stating that Bringman disagreed with the write-up,
but failed to take that reasoning to its logical end, which is that the write-up was factually
incorrect and signing it would have been the equivalent for Bringman of betraying his personal
integrity.

l 7.

When Bringman declined to sign the document containing the misrcprcsentatio:ns

regarding store policy and his actions, Albcrtsons ordered Bringman not to come to work for
approximately three weeks beginning in October 20 l 0. Because he did not hear from Albcrtsons
during th1s period, Bringman had to contact Albertsons numerous times to inquire regarding the
status of his employment Each time Bringman contacted Albertsons, Albertsons informed him
that it was still contemplating the situation. Thereafter, Albcrtsons gave Bringman the choice to
resign or take a substantial cut i11 pay, approximately half of his salary, and move to another store
location. By threatening to demote Bringman for his refusal to sign a false document, Albertsons
forced Bringman to resign from his employment and thereby constructively discharged him.
18.

Therefore, the Exarn.incr's next conclusion is also incorrect. While the Examiner

concludes that "it has not been established that the employer's request was so unreasonable or
burdensome that the claimant's most prudent recourse was to quit his job", Albertsons ordered
Bringman to take mandatory leave after he refused to affinn Albertsons lie. To ask a combat
veteran whose career has been bi1ilt on the foundation of his personal integrity and ability to
follow orders to tie and then to punish him when he refuses to do so is sufficiently outrageous to
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cause such a veteran to leave his employment. Contrary to the Department's statement in its
Determination, Bringman had no '"viable" options available to him because no :reasonable person
would willingly take a substantial cut in pay in exchange for being forced to sign a false
document.
19.

In her hear1ng testimony, Mattson represented that so long as any other work is

available, a claimant has not been discharged. This is not an accurate statement of the law of
constructive discharge. \Vhilc Albe1isons offered Bringman other work, the work it offered was
sig11ificantly less desirable than the work he was doing, and was offered in exchange for far less

pay. While Mr. Bringman earned approximately $46,000 at his position prior to the write-up,
Albe11sons offered him only $13.50 per hour, approximatel.y half that amount, following the

10.·Titc-up. While Mattson is correct that there was work available at

Albertsons~

asking Bringman

to lie by signing a false write-up and then demoting him made his working conditions
unendurable, resulting in his reasonable decision to leave Albertsons employ.

While the

Examiner inexplicably conclttded that "There have been no facts presented which would support
a conclusion that the clahnant was laid off or that there was a lack of

work"~

throughout the

hearing Bringman testified to Albcrtsons informing him that it had no more of his work available
to him, at one point testifying that Wright informed him that the "only available position is this
position that fthey offered h.im]" Audio Recording at 28: 19 (emphasis added). While, in his
situation, "laid off' was constructive discharge, or, in the lexicon of the statute, leaving for
"good cause'\ "laid off" is not in the statute, and there was neither an option fm ' 4good cause"
nor constructive discharge in the onlinc questionnaire.

II.

Bringman Truthfullv and in Good Faith Reported to the Department All
Material Facts with Regard to l:lis Unemployment Insurance Claim.
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Idaho Code Section 72-13 66(12) states that a claimant is not entitled to

unemployment benefits where that claimant willfully makes a false statement or willfully fails to
report a material fact in order to obtain benefits, A claimant ha& a duty to pursue clarification
where the cla1mant knows or finds it highly probable that he or she does not know what
information a question sohcits. Meyer) 589 P.2d at 97.
21.

Following his constructive discharge frorn. Albertsons, Bringman applied for

benefits using the Department's online questionnaire, and so had only three options from which
to choose to describe his termination: l) "Quit", 2) "Terminated", or 3) «Laid-off dt1c to lack of
work".

Bringman selected "laid-off due to lack of work", the description he, in good faith,

believed best described his termination, as he did not leave h.is employment voluntarily without
good cause and Albertsons did not terminate him for misconduct, which was his understanding
of the meaning of the other two options. Further, AJbe1tsons, by pressuring him to sign a false

VVTite-up that misrepresented his actions and then offering him a severe and unwarranted
demotion, had given Bringman the impression that it had no more work for hirn similar to the
work he had been performing. Thus, when examining 111e mere three choices offered hitn on the

online questionnaire with no opportunity to add narrative explanation for his choice, nothing
made Bringman think it was highly probable that he did not know what the question was asking.
He answered the question based upon his experience in being constn1ctively discharged from
Alhertsons, and did so with a great deal of certainty, having this unusual course of events fresh in

his mind. If there was any failure to accurately represent the conditions of his termination, such
failure was accidental and a result of the inability of a claimant to interpret how the Dr.;)partment's
three questionnaire choices mean "constructively discharged'\ "quif', "separated'\ "laid off",
"tcrrnjnated" or some combination of those all at once. Because the willfulness required under
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does not include accidental omissions due to "negligence,

misundefstanding or other cause", Bdngman's application could not have been a wlllfuJ
misrepresentation.

Because Bringman selected the "laid off' option in good faith and without

reservation, fu.Jly understanding the question and believing his answer to best define the
circumstances of his termination, his selection was not a willful false statement or willful failure
to report a material fact.
22.

In January of 2012, the Department contacted Bringman regarding his benefits.

During that conversation, Bringman agab accurately and in good faith conveyed the
circumstances surrounding his termination and his application for benefits to the Department's
representative. If Bringman had intended to wiJl:fulJy misrepresent his reason for leaving his
employment, it would be most unusual for him to misrepresent this fact on the online
questionnaire, only to spill the truth to the Department verbally shortly thereafter. Further, this
was the second instance in which Albertsons had the opportunity to review and Bringman's

claim for unemployment compensat1on. It remains a mystery why Albertsons did not contact the
Department regarding its objection to his claim the first time he submitted it
III.

The Fifth and .Fourteenth Amendments.

23.

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit

seizure of property without prior notice and hearing. Prior to losing his unemployment bei1efits,
the Department afforded Brl11gman no such notice or hearing, and has suspended Bringman's
right to receive benefits subject to him overcoming the burden of pi-oof in his own defense by
"clear and convincing evidence" according to Idaho Code

~

72-1361 _ Depriving Bringman of

his benefits without notice or hearing and subsequently placing on him the burden of proof to
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show that he is entitled to his benefits arc in clear contravention of his due process rights as set
forth by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

CONCLUSION
24.

For all the foregoing reasons, the Decision of Appeals Examiner asserting that

Bringman quit his job without good cause, and therefore was not in compliance with the
conditions for eligibflity under Idaho Code Section 17-1366, should be reversed. For all the
foregoing reasons, the Decision of Appeals Examiner asserting that Bringman did not provide
accurate separation information as required by Idaho Code Section 17-1366 in an attempt to
obtain benefits to which he was not enthled should be reversed.
DATED this~ day of April) 2012.
CAPITOL LAW GROUP, PLLC

-22-2_·· --··----

By: ________
C. Tom Arkoosh, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Billy J_ Bringman

Mn:MORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 12

04/30/2012 MON 15:07 [TX/RX NO 7130]

iaJ013

04/30/2012

PAGE

CAPITOL LAl;,1 GRl' 1 IP

15:00

14/14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

.J.>

day of April, 2012, I served a true and correct

copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) listed bel.ow, in the manner indicated:

Idaho Department of Labor
Appeals Bureau
317 W. Main St.
Boise, ID 83735

_J£"'

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Overnight Courier
Hand De Ii vered
Facsimile 332-7558

C. Tom Arkoosh
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
BILLY J. BRINGMAN,
SSN:
IDOL# 2865-2012
Claimant,
DECISION AND ORDER

v.
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC.,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

Appeal of a Decision issued by an Idaho Department of Labor Appeals Examiner denying
Claimant unemployment insurance benefits. REVERSED in part; AFFIRMED in part.

Claimant, Billy J. Bringman, through counsel, appeals a Decision issued by the Idaho
Department of Labor ("IDOL" or "Department") finding him ineligible for unemployment
insurance benefits.

The Appeals Examiner found that: 1) Claimant voluntarily quit his job

without good cause connected with the employment; 2) Employer's account is not chargeable for
experience rating purposes; 3) Claimant willfully made a false statement or willfully failed to
report a material fact in order to obtain unemployment benefits; and 4) Claimant is not entitled to
a waiver of the overpayment. Claimant, Employer and IDOL participated in the hearing. Due
process was adequately served.
On April 5, 2012, Claimant requested the opportunity to submit a brief. The Commission
granted that request and issued a briefing schedule by Order dated April 20, 2012. Claimant was
the only party to submit a brief. (Claimant's Brief, filed April 30, 2012). The arguments
contained in Claimant's brief will be considered and given appropriate weight.
DECISION AND ORDER - 1

In his brief, Claimant argues that he has a property right in his benefits and those benefits
were denied without notice or hearing. (Claimant's Brief). Therefore, Claimant asserts a due
process issue. That issue is addressed below.
The undersigned Commissioners have conducted a de nova review of the record pursuant
to Idaho Code§ 72-1368(7). Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 279, 787 P.2d
263, 265 (1990). The Commission has relied on the audio recording of the hearing before the
Appeals Examiner conducted on March 12, 2012, along with the Exhibits [1 through 3; 3-A; 4
through 16] admitted into the record during that proceeding.
DUE PROCESS

Claimant asserts that his property right in his unemployment benefits was denied without
notice or hearing. (Claimant's Brief). However, the record shows that Claimant was afforded
adequate notice and a hearing regarding the denial of his unemployment insurance benefits.
"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner."' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal
quotation omitted); Accord Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork, 145 Idaho at 127, 176 P.3d at
132. Due process requires notice and, in some cases, an evidentiary hearing. Id.
In accordance with Idaho Code § 72-1368(5) and IDAPA 09.01.06.026, IDOL provided
Claimant with notice of the issues which denied his benefits and offered Claimant the
opportunity for a hearing before an IDOL appeals examiner.

(Exhibit 1).

Claimant took

advantage of that opportunity and participated in the hearing on March 12, 2012. (Audio
recording). The Idaho Supreme Court recently held that a party's due process rights were
satisfied by the initial IDOL hearing. Hopkins v. Pneumotech Inc., 152 Idaho 611, _ , P.3d
1242, 1246 (2012). Claimant received adequate due process.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the evidence in the record, the Commission concurs with and adopts the
Findings of Fact as set forth in the Appeals Examiner's Decision with the following additions.
1. The write-up noted Claimant's "continued display of poor leadership skills" and warned
if "after the date of this letter you continue to exhibit poor judgment and poor leadership
skills as determined by management, you will be immediately demoted or terminated at
management discretion."
2. According to Employer's cashier policy, employees are to "Verify ID on all personal
check system prompts ... "

The policy further states "Compliance to the procedures

outline [in the policy] is imperative. Associates may not, based upon perceptions of
ability to pay or any other reason deviate from the stated company policy."

DISCUSSION
Quit

Claimant worked for Employer from May 12, 2004 through December 4, 2010. (Audio
recording; Exhibit 7, p. 3). At the time of separation, Claimant was an Assistant Store Director.
Employer asserts that Claimant had ongoing and perpetual problems with leadership. In October
of 2012, Claimant refused to accept a check from a longtime customer. Employer contends that
Claimant mishandled the situation and subsequently issued Claimant a write-up for the incident.
(Audio recording). The write-up noted Claimant's "continued display of poor leadership skills"
and warned if "after the date of this letter you continue to exhibit poor judgment and poor
leadership skills as determined by management, you will be immediately demoted or terminated
at management discretion." (Exhibit 12, p. 6). Claimant refused to sign the write-up. Employer
subsequently sent Claimant home for approximately three weeks. (Audio recording).
After Claimant received the write-up, Employer contends that Claimant's conduct for
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which he was warned of in the write-up continued. As a result, Employer contacted Claimant to
meet with the Vice President of Human Resources, Shane Wright. At the meeting, Claimant was
offered two employment options: either resign with a severance package and the possibility of
rehire in six (6) months or accept a demotion to fourth key position person. Claimant was
instructed to take the weekend to think about the choices. Claimant chose to resign because it
offered the best options for future employment and because the demotion was not suitable
employment. (Audio recording).
Employer maintains that Claimant quit. However, Claimant contends that he was
constructively discharged because Employer forced him to quit. Pursuant to the Idaho
Employment Security law, in cases where the parties dispute whether the claimant voluntarily
quit or was discharged, the legal test is whether there are sufficient words or actions by an
employer to logically lead a prudent employee to believe that his or her employment has been
terminated. Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District, 98 Idaho 330, 334-335, 583 P. 2d 54, 58-59
(1977). Claimant bears the initial burden of showing that he was discharged. "Only if the
claimant proves discharge does the employer have the burden of proving misconduct." Johnson
v. Idaho Central Credit Union, 127 Idaho 867, 869, 908 P.2d 560, 562 (1995).
Claimant failed to sufficiently show words or actions by Employer that would logically
lead a prudent employee to believe that his or her employment was terminated. Employer
offered Claimant the option of leaving his job with a severance package or continued
employment. (Audio recording; Exhibit· 7, p. 4). Although Claimant may not have liked the
choices, he was, nonetheless, offered the option of continuing work and preserving the
employment relationship. Claimant testified that he chose to leave his employment and take the
severance package because he felt it placed him in the best position for future employment.
(Audio recording). Therefore, Claimant chose to leave his job instead of continuing employment
with Employer. Claimant was the separating party in this matter.
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In accordance with the Idaho Employment Security law, Claimant voluntarily left his
employment rather than continue the employment relationship. Claimant quit. The analysis
continues to determine whether he did so for good cause connected with the employment.
Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) provides, in pertinent part, that a claimant is eligible for
unemployment insurance benefits if he or she left his employment voluntarily with good cause
connected with the employment. If a claimant voluntarily quits, the claimant bears the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that s/he quit for "good cause."

Edwards v.

Independence Serv., Inc., 140 Idaho 912, 915, 104 P.3d 954, 957 (2004). "A preponderance of
the evidence is evidence that, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force
and from which a greater probability of truth results." Id. at 916, 104 P.3d at 958.
What constitutes "good cause" for quitting employment is defined both by the Idaho
Supreme Court and in the Idaho Administrative Code. IDAPA 09.01.30.450.03 provides that
"good cause" is established when the claimant demonstrates that his or her real, substantial, and
compelling circumstances would have forced a "reasonable person" to quit. "Good cause" must
be connected with employment, and the reason for leaving must arise from the working
conditions, job tasks, or employment agreement. IDAPA 09.01.30.450.02. Further, when an
employee has viable options available, voluntary termination without exploring those options
does not constitute good cause for obtaining unemployment compensation. Higgins v. Larry
Miller Subaru-Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1, 4-5, 175 P.3d 163, 166-167 (2007).
Claimant chose to quit his job when presented with only two options by Employer: 1)
resign, or 2) accept a demotion to fourth key position.

(Audio recording; Exhibit 7, p. 3).

Retaining his position as an Assistant Store Manager was not an option. Claimant chose to
resign because the demotion was not suitable employment and Claimant felt quitting was the best
option regarding his future employment. (Audio recording).
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Although Claimant's personal and subjective feelings regarding the preservation of his
future employment does not constitute good cause for leaving his employment, the record
contains sufficient evidence that the continued employment offered by Employer was not suitable
for Claimant. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that quitting work that is not suitable is always
good cause for leaving employment. Clay v. BMC West Truss Plant, 127 Idaho 501, 504, 903
P.2d 90, 93 (1995). Further, an employee has good cause to quit his employment "when the
conditions [are] unsuitable when compared to the conditions of the job as originally offered."
Clay v. Crooks Industries, 96 Idaho 378, 379, 529 P.2d 774, 775 (1974). A wage reduction can
constitute a substantial adverse change in conditions giving a claimant good cause to leave
employment. Kyle v. Beco Corp., 109 Idaho 267, 269, 707 P.2d 378, 380 (1985).
At the time Claimant left his job, he faced an imminent and substantial wage reduction.
His former position as an assistant manager was no longer available. The offered demotion
reduced his yearly wages by at least $20,000. Furthermore, the fourth key position was not
salaried, as was the assistant manager position, but was paid by the hour. Claimant testified that
he may not receive many hours with the demotion. (Audio recording).
Although Employer contends that the exact terms of the demotion were not discussed,
Mr. Wright did not contest the significant wage reduction or Claimant's concerns about the
number of hours available. (Audio recording). Therefore, since the reduction in Claimant's
wage was substantial, the job was not suitable for Claimant.
It is not lost on the Commission that Employer's reason for demoting Claimant was due

to Claimant's alleged failure to follow Employer's procedures and policies and for displaying
continued leadership issues. We do not wish to foster the impression that an employer is not
allowed to discipline an employee as it sees fit. However, in this case, the record lacks evidence
to support Employer's reason for the demotion, thereby making the demotion more akin to a
unilateral change in the terms of the employment agreement.
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It i's undisputed that Claimant received a write up after a customer complained. The
customer attempted to pay with a check; however, she did not have proper identification. (Audio
recording). Employer's computer system required that ID must be shown to complete the
transaction. According to Employer's policy, employees are to "Verify ID on all personal check
system prompts ... " The policy further states "Compliance to the procedures outlined [in the
policy] is imperative. Associates may not, based upon perceptions of ability to pay or any other
reason deviate from the stated company policy." (Exhibit 12, p. 7). Since the customer did not
have identification, Claimant declined to accept the check. Claimant testified that he calmly
explained the situation to the customer, but the customer became irate.

(Audio recording).

Employer did not offer any first hand evidence to dispute Claimant's testimony.
The customer apparently notified Employer about the incident and Employer issued
Claimant a write-up.

The write-up instructed Claimant to follow Employer's policy and

procedure and noted Claimant displayed poor leadership skills during the incident. (Exhibit 7, p. 5).
The record lacks any evidence of Claimant's "poor leadership skills" and Employer did not
elaborate during the hearing.

Based on this record, Claimant acted in accordance with

Employer's policy and there is no evidence that he exhibited "poor leadership skills."
Claimant further testified that, after receiving the write-up, he was suspended for three
weeks and did not work. Thereafter, he met with Mr. Wright and, at that time, was offered the
demotion. While Mr. Wright contends that the demotion was in response to continued leadership
problems displayed by Claimant after the write-up, Mr. Wright does not have personal
knowledge that Claimant returned to work after the incident. Rather, Mr. Write only talked with
a co-worker who stated Claimant had returned to work. (Audio recording). Claimant's first
hand testimony carries greater weight than Mr. Wright's hearsay testimony. Therefore, this
record lacks sufficient evidence of Claimant's poor leadership skills that led to the offer of a
demotion. In other words, the record lacks competent evidence that Employer's offer of the
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demotion was due to Claimant's conduct. Therefore, Employer's offer of a demotion is more
akin to a unilateral change in employment and the offer of continued employment, as analyzed
above, was not suitable.
Employer's offer of continued employment at a substantially lower wage was not suitable
work for Claimant under the facts contained in this record. This reason constituted good cause to
voluntarily leave his employment.
Even though Claimant's reason constituted good cause to quit, Claimant must also
establish that he explored viable options prior to quitting. Claimant testified that he talked with
Mr. Wright and his supervisor about the check incident and to explain his circumstances,
however those attempts were futile. He also expressed his dissatisfaction with the demotion to
Mr. Wright. However, Claimant was presented with only two options: either resign or be
demoted. (Audio recording). There is no indication in this record that any other available options
existed for Claimant. Claimant is eligible for benefits.
Chargeability

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-1351(2)(a), an employer's experience rated account is
chargeable for benefits paid to a claimant who is discharged for reasons other than misconduct
connected with employment or quits with good cause connected with employment. Employer
paid the most wages to Claimant during the last four base quarters. (Exhibit 14). Since Claimant
voluntarily left his employment for good cause connected with the employment, Employer's
account is chargeable for experience rating purposes.
Willful Failure to Report Material Facts

When Claimant filed for benefits effective December 5, 2010 and December 12, 2011,
Claimant reported his separation from Employer was cause by a "Layoff due to lack of work."
(Exhibits 3 & 3-A). However, IDOL determined that Claimant was not laid off due to lack of
work and that Claimant willfully made a false statement in order to obtain unemployment
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insurance benefits. (Exhibit 9). Claimant disagrees.
Idaho Code § 72-1366(12) provides that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment
insurance benefits if it is determined that he or she willfully made a false statement or failed to
report a material fact to IDOL.

Furthermore, Idaho Code § 72-1366(12) also disqualifies a

claimant for a period of fifty-two (52) weeks to any benefits he or she may otherwise be entitled to
in the future.

A claimant has the burden of proving his/her eligibility for benefits by a

preponderance of the evidence whenever the claim is questioned. Guillard v. Department of
Employment, 100 Idaho 647, 653, 603 P.2d 981, 987 (1979).
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a claimant who fails to accurately report the
reason for his separation can be found to have willfully made a false statement under Idaho Code
§72-1366(12). Current v. Haddon Fencing, 152 Idaho 10, 266 P.3d 485 (2011). Claimant does
not dispute that he reported "Layoff due to lack of work" from Employer when he filed for
benefits. Nor does Claimant dispute that when he filed for benefits on December 8, 2010 and
again on December 12, 2011, he did so for the purpose of obtaining benefits. (Audio recording;
Exhibits 3, p. 1 & 3-A, p. 1). Rather, Claimant contends that any failure to accurately report on his
claims was not done willfully.

(Audio recording). Therefore, the crux of this matter is

determining whether Claimant's false statement was willful.
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined "willful" as follows:
"(Willfully) implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make
the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, in the sense
of having an evil or corrupt motive or intent. It does imply a conscious wrong,
and may be distinguished from an act maliciously or corruptly done, in that it
does not necessarily imply an evil mind, but is more nearly synonymous with
'intentionally,'

'designedly,'

accidental."
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'without lawful excuse,' and therefore not

Meyer, at 761, 589 P.3d at 96. The Court has also held that it is sufficient to find a
claimant's actions willful when the Department made the claimant aware of the reporting
requirements, but the claimant nonetheless failed to follow those regulations. In Gaehring v.
Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 118, 594 P.2d 628 (1979), the Court affirmed the
Commission's determination that the claimant willfully failed to report his earnings based on
evidence that the claimant was aware of the regulations regarding unemployment insurance but
did not follow those regulations when reporting. Gaehring, 100 Idaho at 119, 594 P.2d at 629.
During the claim filing process, Claimant was required to watch a slide show and review
the Unemployment Insurance Claimant Rights, Responsibilities and Filing Instructions pamphlet
("pamphlet.") (Audio recording; Exhibit 2-B). The slide show specifically informed Claimant
that the information he provided must be accurate and expressly stated fraud included making
false statements such as reporting a claimant was laid off when the claimant quit. During the
slide show, Claimant was also informed that he was responsible for knowing the information
found in the pamphlet. (Audio recording). The pamphlet reiterated that fraud included "Failing
to notify the Idaho Department of Labor when you quit or are discharged from work ... " (Exhibit
2-B, p. 15).

The pamphlet also instructed Claimant that if "there is anything you do not

understand, ask your local office." (Exhibit 2-B, p. 3). It provided phone numbers for all of
IDOL's local offices. (Exhibit 2-B, p. 17). Therefore, Claimant was adequately warned that he
must accurately report his separation when he filed his claim.
Claimant asserts that he picked the best option from the drop down menu provided on the
claim filing system when asked for the reason that he left his employment. Claimant asserts that
he was laid off due to a lack of suitable employment. However, since the drop down menu only
allowed Claimant to choose "quit," "discharge," and "laid off due to lack of work," Claimant felt
that the "laid off due to lack of work" was the best option. (Audio recording).
When reviewing a claimant's testimony explaining his or her failure to accurately report
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on a claim, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "The fact finder may consider the claimant's
explanation unworthy of belief." Meyer, at 762, P.2d at 97. Based on the evidence in the record,
such is the case here.

Claimant testified that he did not believe he quit his employment.

However, Claimant agreed that he was presented with the option of either continuing his
employment or not. (Audio recording). The decision to separate his employment relationship
was solely Claimant's. Claimant chose to leave his employment even though additional work
was available. A reasonable individual would most likely find that they quit their employment in
that situation.
However, even if we were to find that Claimant did not believe he quit his job, the record
shows that Claimant understood that none of the options offered on the claim filing system,
including the option he chose, fit his situation.

However, despite that understanding, and

knowing from the instructions provided by the claim filing system that he must provide accurate
information, Claimant never contacted the department for clarification on how to accurately
report his situation. Claimant stated he did not choose "quit" or "discharge" because he did not
believe that either option applied to his situation. However, Claimant also acknowledged that he
was not "laid off due to lack of work." When asked if continuing work was available, Claimant
agreed. (Audio recording). Therefore, applying Claimant's logic, none of the options accurately
characterized the nature of his separation.
Claimant knew the option he chose was not accurate. However, Claimant admits that he
never contacted the Department for clarification on which option he was to choose. (Audio
recording; Exhibit 6, p. 3). The Idaho Supreme Court has concluded that when a "claimant knew
what information IDCL [IDOL] solicited, but nevertheless deliberately chose to respond without
pursuing clarification ordinarily supports a finding of willful falsehood or concealment." Cox v.
Hollow Leg Pub and Brewery, 144 Idaho 154, 158, 58 P.3d 930, 934 (2007), citing Meyer, at
762, 589 P.2d at 97 (1979).
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Individuals filing claims for unemployment benefits do make inadvertent errors that do
not stem from any malicious intent.

However, in this case, IDOL provided Claimant with

adequate information that he must provide accurate separation information when he filed his
claim and to contact the Department if he had questions. Despite knowing that he was not "laid
off due to lack of work," Claimant nonetheless picked that option without seeking any
clarification as he was instructed to do. Claimant's failure to accurately report his separation
information constitutes a disregard of his obligation to report this information as accurately as
possible. Therefore, Claimant's behavior during the relevant weeks was the type Idaho Code §
72-1366(12) was intended to discourage. Claimant is ineligible for waiting week credit and
benefits for the weeks effective December 5, 2010 through December 3, 2011 and December 11,
2011 through January 14, 2012 as well as the fifty-two (52) week disqualification period
effective February 5, 2012 through February 2, 2013.
Waiver

The Appeals Examiner also concluded that Claimant is ineligible for a waiver and must
repay the benefits he received, but to which he was not entitled. Claimant received his benefits
from the State of Idaho. (Exhibit 10). Idaho Code provides that the requirement to repay an
overpayment, other than one resulting from a false statement, misrepresentation, or failure to
report a material fact by the claimant, can be waived. However, the claimant must demonstrate
that 1) the benefit payments were made solely as a result of department error and made to a
claimant who could not reasonably have been expected to recognize the error; or 2) the benefit
payment was a result of an employer misrepresenting wages earned and the claimant could not
reasonably have been expected to recognize the error. Idaho Code§ 72-1369(5) (2011).
Claimant received benefits for the weeks at issue because he did not disclose all of the
material information relevant to determining his eligibility. In particular, Claimant received
benefits because he failed to accurately report the reason for his separation from Employer. As
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concluded above, Claimant's false statement was willful. Idaho Code § 72-1369(5) specifically
excludes from eligibility for a waiver those claimants whose overpayment resulted from a false
statement, misrepresentation, or failure to report a material fact. Because Claimant received
unemployment benefits in violation of § 72-1366(12), he is ineligible for a waiver and must
repay the benefits he received, but to which he was not entitled, as well as the applicable
penalties assessed in accordance with Idaho Code§ 72-1369(2).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I

Claimant voluntarily quit his job with good cause connected to the employment.
II

Employer's account is chargeable for experience rating purposes.
III

Claimant willfully made a false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact for
the purpose of obtaining unemployment benefits and is ineligible for waiting week credit and
unemployment insurance benefits effective December 5, 2010 through December 3, 2011 and
December 11, 2011 through January 14, 2012, as well as the fifty-two (52) week period effective
February 5, 2012 through February 2, 2013.
III

Claimant is not entitled to a waiver of the overpayment and must repay benefits that he
received, but to which he was not entitled.
IV

Claimant is subject to the associated penalty pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-1369(2).
ORDER

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Decision of the Appeals Examiner is REVERSED as
to the issue of separation and chargeability and AFFIRMED on all other issues.
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Claimant

voluntarily quit his job with good cause connected to the employment. Employer's account is
chargeable for experience rating purposes. Claimant willfully made a false statement or willfully
failed to report a material fact for the purpose of obtaining unemployment benefits and is
ineligible for waiting week credit and unemployment insurance benefits effective December 5,
2010 through December 3, 2011 and December 11, 2011 through January 14, 2012, as well as
the fifty-two (52) week period effective February 5, 2012 through February 2, 2013. Claimant is
not entitled to a waiver of the overpayment and must repay benefits that he received, but to
which he was not entitled. Claimant is subject to the associated penalty pursuant to Idaho Code §
72-1369(2). This is a final order under Idaho Code § 72-1368(7).

DATED this(fi;laay

olJJ7~

,2012.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

R.D. Maynard, Commissioner
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STATE HOUSE MAIL
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C. Tom Arkoosh, ISB # 2253
CAPITOL LAW GROUP, PLLC
250 North 10th Street, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 2598
Boise, Idaho 83701-2598
Telephone (208) 424-8872
Facsimile (208) 424-8874
Attorney for Billy J. Bringman

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BIL
SSN

N,
IDOL No. 2865-2012
Claimant/Appellant,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
NEW ALBERTSONS INC.,
Employer/Respondent,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent.

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, NEW ALBERTSONS INC, AND THE
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellant, Billy J. Bringman, appeals against the above named

respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Decision and Order entered in the above entitled

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

action on the

9th

day of July, 2012, the Idaho Industrial Commission Chairman Thomas E.

Limbaugh, presiding.
2.

That the pa1iy has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or

orders described in paragraph l above are appealab!e orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (d) I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal are:
(a)

Whether the Industrial Commission erred m simultaneously finding

constructive discharge and ordering return of the award.
(b)

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding Appellant willfully made

a material false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact in order to
obtain unemployment benefit.
(c)

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding Appellant not entitled to

a waiver under the circumstances of this case.
(d)

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding the Commission made

the Appellant aware of the reporting requirements.
( e)

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding, under the circumstances,

Appellant made an inaccurate statement.

(f)

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding the Appellant's

explanation unworthy of belief when the Industrial Commission failed to provide
"accurate" options but instead provided options that did not reflect reasons for
leaving work described in statutory language.
(g)

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding the decision to separate

from

Appellant's employment relationship was solely Appellants, while
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simultaneously finding that Appellant's employer constructively discharged
Appellant.
(h)

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding the Appellant had an

affirmative duty to contact the Industrial Commission to assure the Industrial
Commission clarify its forms to more accurately reflect his circumstance; or, is
Appellant's duty to provide the most accurate information allowed.
(i)

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding the Appellant had an

affirmative duty to investigate the state's employment law and determine whether the
information options provided by the Industrial Commission were in fact accurate.

U)

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding that Appellant was not

entitled to waiver because Appellant should have recognized the Commission's effor
in the Commissions information retrieval system.
(k)

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding Appellant received

benefits because of material false statements rather than receive benefits because he
was entitled to benefits because Appellant was constructively discharged.
(1)

The Appellant reserves the right to present other issues on appeal.

4.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

5.

An Agency's transcript is requested.

6.

Appellant requests the contents of the Agency's record contain the standard

documents as outlined in Idaho Appellate Rule 28(b)(3), in addition to the following:
(a)

The Appellant requests the audio recording of the hearing before the Appeals

Examiner conducted on March 12, 2012, along with the Exhibits [l through 3; 3-A; 4
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through 16] admitted into the recording during that proceeding, to be copied and sent
to the Supreme Court.
(b)

Claimant's Brief, filed April 30, 2012.

7.

The appeal is taken upon matters of law.

8.

I certify the following:
(a)

A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Commission

Secretary.
(b)

The Appellant has paid the appellate filing fee pursuant to I.A.R. 23(a)(3).

(c)

The Appellant has paid the administrative agency the estimated fee for

preparation of the Agency's record and transcript.
(d)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to

I.A.R. 20 and the Attorney General of the State of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 67-1401(1).
DA TED this

j!iJ day of August, 2012.
CAPITOL LAW GROUP, PLLC

C. Tom Arkoosh
Attorney for Appellant
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United States Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Courier
Via Facsimile
Hand Delivered

Commission Secretary
Idaho Industrial Commission
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0041

United States Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Courier
Via Facsimile
Hand Delivered

New Albertsons Inc
c/o TALX UC Express
Attn: Frank Eckert
P. 0. Box 173860
Denver, CO 80217-3860

United States Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Courier
Via Facsimile
Hand Delivered

C. Tom Arkoosh@
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
BILLY J. BRINGMAN,
Claimant/Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO. 40232

v.
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC.,

NOTICE OF COMPLETION

Employer/Respondent,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR/Respondent.

TO:

STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK OF THE COURTS; AND
C. TOM ARKOOSH, ESQ., FOR CLAIMANT BILLY J BRINGMAN; AND
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC. PRO SE FOR EMPLOYER/RESPONDENT; AND
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN, ESQ., FOR IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR/RESPONDENT.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date,

and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
TOM C. ARKOOSH
250 N lOTH STREET, 4TH FLOOR
POBOX2598
BOISE ID 83701-2598
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC., PRO SE
C/O TALX UC EXPRESS
Did not participate at l/C level.
No record will be provided
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
317 W. MAIN STREET
BOISE, ID 83735
You are further notified that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all
parties have twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the Record,
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including requests for corrections, additions or deletions.

In the event no objections to the

Agency's Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the March 12, 2012 Transcript
and Record shall be deemed settled.
DATED at Boise, Idaho this _ _ _ day of __,..,..'-"'-'I'"--"
~.USTRIAL COMMl~ION

;g , A~
~~@
Jessica A Solis
>

Assistant Commission Secretary
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